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Abstract 
The Agricultural Development Bank of the Dominican Republic has experienced 
liquidity shortages in the 1980s, in part due to the growth of its non-performing portfolio. 
This paper documents the results of a field survey on the repayment status of a sample of 
loans granted in 1987. In order to overcome deficiencies in the bank's measures of 
delinquency, the performance of 3,455 sample loans was tracked over two years, focusing 
on installment arrears, rescheduling, and default. Repayment performance was related to 
borrower and loan contract characteristics, in order to generate a profile of the delinquent 
portfolio. These features included type of borrower, land tenure, type of investment, source 
of funds, and collateral. Approximately 72 percent of the number and 57 percent of the 
volume of loans had experienced some type of repayment problem. Marketing difficulties 
were identified as an important source of arrears, suggesting a role for "bridge loans." 
Recommendations are offered on how to improve the bank's viability. 
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THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 
A LOAN REPAYMENT ANALYSIS 
Nelson A. Aguilera, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, and Douglas H. Graham 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
I. Introduction 
The Banco Agricola de la Republica Dominicana (BAGRICOLA) has experienced 
major liquidity shortages and operational losses during the late 1980s. An important factor 
behind these developments, compromising the financial viability of the bank, has been the 
growth of its non-performing (delinquent) portfolio. This report focuses on this issue, by 
documenting the results of an extensive field survey on the repayment status of a sample of 
loans disbursed in 1987. From these results, recommendations are presented to support 
Banco Agricola officials in their current efforts to reform internal operational procedures, 
in order to gain greater viability for the future. 
Past efforts to measure default and delinquency in Banco Agricola have been 
misleading. The true state of default and delinquency has been seriously underestimated 
through the use of an inappropriate index of default. The bank has typically presented loans 
in arrears over total loans outstanding. This ratio has declined from 21 percent in 1983 to 
6.9 percent in 1988. This is not consistent with the serious delinquency problems faced by 
the bank, indicating there are important deficiencies in this measure. First, only loans that 
have completed their full term and are in default have been classified as past due. All the 
remaining medium and long-term loans that have yet to complete their term have been 
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excluded, even if a significant proportion of the on-going installment payments has been in 
arrears. Second, total loans outstanding includes a substantial injection of new long-term 
loans granted in recent years, a large proportion of whose volume is not yet due. When the 
bank reports the ratio of arrears over total loans outstanding as a default index, therefore, 
it is inadvertently hiding potentially serious default problems. Put differently, delinquency 
and default ratios should be based on the volume of arrears over the relevant portfolio that 
has already fallen due, including delinquent installments. It makes no sense to include in 
the denominator loan amounts that are not yet due. Furthermore, many delinquent loans 
have been rescheduled by BAGRICOLA and have been thereby classified as current (i.e., 
without arrears). This also hides the actual extent of the repayment problem, since these 
loans already show signs of non-performance. 
II. Design of the Default and Arrears Study 
To address this problem, the Ohio State University team drew a random sample of 
all loans disbursed in 1987 and tracked their performance over the succeeding two years (up 
to the end of August, 1989). The random sample of 3,455 loan dossiers from 18 representa-
tive branches amounted to approximately 9 percent of the total number of loan applications 
in 1987. Of this total, 569 applications had been rejected, 538 had been withdrawn by the 
loan applicants, and 2,251 had been finally approved by the bank. 
In addition, the repayment status of these loans (as of August 31, 1989) disbursed in 
1987 was classified according to six categories: 
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(1) complete or partial default (vencido), if the total loan or some installments 
of longer term loans were unpaid 30 days after the due date. Since a consid-
erable number of these loans had already completed their term maturity by 
August, 1989, one can refer to this category as representing hardcore default; 
(2) in litigation, if unpaid loans (or installments) were subject to legal collection 
procedures; 
(3) rescheduled, if the repayment period of the loan had been extended without 
altering the sum of principal and interest outstanding; 
( 4) paid with arrears, for loans with completed term maturity, if the loan or 
installments had been paid later than 30 days after the due date; 
(5) current, if loans or installments were not yet due; and 
( 6) paid without arrears, if loans or installments had been paid within 30 days of 
the due date. 
Defaulting loans are just one dimension of the loan repayment problems faced by the 
institution in recent years. Installment arrears and the rescheduling of outstanding loans 
constitute another important dimension of the repayment problems faced by the bank. 
Hence, any meaningful analysis of the repayment performance of outstanding loans dis-
bursed by development institutions must examine the incidence of rescheduling and install-
ment arrears, as well. 
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III. Profile of the Delinquent Portfolio 
The effects of different borrower and loan contract characteristics on loan repayment 
performance are reviewed, according to several cross-classified variables with loan repay-
ment. Detailed loan repayment status is reported for the number and volume of loans 
granted by type of borrower, land tenure, type of investment, source of funds, and type of 
collateral. 
It was discovered, in adding up the four categories of default and arrears (1) through 
(4), that approximately 72 percent of the number of loans granted in 1987, and 57 percent 
of the volume disbursed, had experienced some type of default or arrears. Finally, it is 
pertinent to underscore the fact that 45 percent of the total sample of loans, accounting for 
20 percent of the volume disbursed, fell into the hardcore default category (vencido ). The 
costs of recovering these loans, many of which had completed their term in default, would 
be high and the results problematical. It is now easier to understand why the bank has been 
experiencing liquidity problems and generating operational losses. The inability to secure 
reasonable loan repayments restricts the funding base for new loans (i.e., th~ liquidity 
problem), while the lack of interest earnings from defaulted loans and collection costs 
contribute to operational losses. 
(1) Default by Type of Borrower, Tenancy, and Collateral 
The results for specific borrowers and loan characteristics are revealing. Except when 
indicated otherwise, this summary's comments will focus on hard core default (category one). 
Fifty-seven (57) percent of the individual agrarian reform borrowers were in default, 
compared to 41 percent for agrarian reform associations. Private individual (non-reform) 
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borrowers, however, also registered a high default rate (42 percent). Only non-reform 
associations recorded a substantially lower level of default (22 percent). 
Borrowers with all forms of land tenure recorded fairly high levels of default. It is 
of interest to note, however, that tenants (renters, sharecroppers, and others) recorded a 
lower default rate (33 percent of their number) than individual private owners (41 p.ercent) 
and individual occupants without title on state lands ( 42 percent). Individual land ownership 
does not necessarily lead, therefore, to lower default, although individual agrarian reform 
beneficiaries showed the highest default indexes (57 percent of their number). This latter 
set of borrowers clearly represents a high risk, adverse clientele for the bank's viability. 
The fact that individual owner-cultivators registered higher default rates than tenants 
suggests that mortgages do not play a role in ensuring sound loan repayment behavior. This 
may be due to the fact that mortgages are rarely used as a form of collateral by the bank. 
Mortgages and the equally secure pignoraticia guarantee (inventory under control of the 
bank) comprised less than two percent of the collateral used in the sample of 2,251loans. 
Prenda guarantees (crop or livestock lien pledges) accounted for 98 percent of the collateral 
in the sample and these pledges are clearly weak guarantees, since they tend to disappear 
in case of difficulties or are simply insufficient. Until the bank changes its predominant 
form of guarantee, collateral will never be able to be used as an instrument to induce 
responsible loan repayment. Given the large proportion of land reform beneficiaries and 
of borrowers without title in the portfolio, this may not be a feasible path and other 
mechanisms to ensure portfolio performance must be found. 
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(2). Default by Loan Use 
Livestock activities rank high as default-prone loans, with 57 percent of these 
borrowers classified in hardcore default. This largely grows out of the government-funded 
small livestock program. Machinery and equipment loans also rank high, with 47 percent 
of their number in default. The most interesting finding in the default profile by enterprise 
type, however, is in relation to industrial food crops and agricultural export crops. These 
activities registered relatively small levels of hard core default both in terms of numbers of 
loans (26 and 24 percent, respectively), and of the volume of loans disbursed (7 and 16 
percent, respectively). Nevertheless, both these activities registered high levels of loans paid 
with arrears (39 percent of the number of industrial food crop loans and 29 percent of the 
number of agricultural export loans). These percentages were even higher for the volume 
of loans paid with arrears (81 and 54 percent respectively). 
This underscores the role that marketing problems play in compromising the bank's 
portfolio with arrears. These industrial food crop producers of tomatoes, pineapple, melons, 
and sorghum sell their crops to processors, who then delay payment to the farmers until 
after their product has been sold successfully down the marketing chain. Consequently, the 
farmers fall into late payments (arrears) to the bank. It is important to note, however, that 
these borrowers do in fact end up repaying a large proportion of their debt obligations to 
Banco Agricola, as seen in the relatively low hardcore default index for these borrowers. 
This raises the question of whether bridge loans to these processor intermediaries 
might not help alleviate this problem. On the one hand, the bank could reduce the liquidity 
constraints facing these processor-marketers by granting them short-term loans, which in 
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turn could allow them to pay their farmer suppliers on time. This would then allow these 
farm borrowers to repay the bank more promptly. On the other hand, the bank could grant 
loans to processors not only to cover their liquidity shortfall to purchase farm output, but 
an additional amount to in turn pass on as production loans to the farm suppliers they have 
contracted into their network. This would relieve the bank from the transaction costs of 
administering a large number of small farm loans and facilitate prompt repayment. 
These options, however, are based on the premise that the processor and exporter 
intermediaries would be responsible clients and the bank would behave as a disciplined 
lender effectively monitoring and collecting its loans. One suspects that in the past the 
processors have taken advantage of their farm supplier clientele to command a liquidity 
leverage for their own use through delayed payments. They would be inclined to do the 
same to BAGRICOLA if the bank's image as a lax loan collector is not improved. There-
fore, any new policy emphasizing bridge loans to farmers though processor-intermediaries 
and exporters should not only anticipate the savings in transaction costs implicit in this 
approach, but also evaluate the risk of poor loan repayment from the intermediaries 
themselves. 
(3) Loan Default by Source of Funds 
The other major finding in these default statistics relates to the source of funding. 
As noted earlier, government-sourced loans to small livestock pig producers and agrarian 
reform beneficiaries registered very high levels of default ( 64 percent and 41 percent of the 
number of loans, respectively). The international source FIDA funds also registered high 
default rates (74 percent of the number of loans). Other loans from international sources 
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(IDB, AID, and World Bank) fell in between, with still relatively high rates of hardcore 
default (33 percent of the number of loans). At the other extreme are the remarkably low 
hardcore default rates for loans made from locally mobilized deposits (4 percent). 
It is clear that the bank is much more careful in loan evaluation for deposit-based 
loans. On the other hand, government and international sourced funds are associated with 
targeted loans directed to a higher risk and more default-prone clientele with predictable, 
negative consequences. 
Another interesting finding relates to the contrast between World Bank and IDB 
loans, on the one hand, and USAID loans, on the other hand. The former registered high 
hardcore default rates ( 45 percent of the volume of World Bank loans and 38 percent of the 
volume of IDB loans disbursed), while the USAID program registered low hardcore default 
(5 percent of the volume). It is pertinent to note that World Bank and IDB loan funds are 
targeted to specific clientele, that in the end turned out to be default-prone customers. 
Many of the IDB loans were targeted to new customers, which introduced higher risks than 
clientele already known to bank personnel. Also, highly default-prone livestock l_oans were 
targeted into the IDB portfolio. The World Bank loans were targeted to cacao and coffee 
export farmers, who were unfortunately experiencing penalizing pricing policies from the 
Government, through overvalued exchange rates during the 1980s. 
On the other hand, USAID loans from a revolving fund were not targeted. Further-
more, the bank has to repay the USAID loan fund before receiving a new injection of funds 
from the revolving fund. These two measures (the absence -of targeting and the criteria of 
good loan repayment before new tranches are released) suggest that these actions lead to 
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much lower default rates than targeted loan policies. The IDB, the World Bank, and FIDA 
;could improve the viability of BAGRICOLA by removing their targeting to high-risk 
clientele and emulate the USAID policy of untargeted loans. 
A final feature of international loans merits comment. The bank's system of 
customer credit rating (before granting loans) is generally consistent with the resulting 
default record. Customers borrowing from deposit-based funds received good credit ratings 
prior to loan approval and the resulting low default confirmed the bank's judgement. 
Similarly, FIDA and agrarian reform customers did not receive high credit ratings (reflecting 
the bank's recognition of its risks with these clients) and, not surprisingly, they recorded high 
default rates. The only exception to this record of consistency is associated with internation-
ally funded loans. Many World Bank and IDB clients received high credit ratings prior to 
the disbursment of these loans, but in the end they registered relatively high default rates. 
A possible explanation of this inconsistent record is that these international donors (except 
for USAID) do not emphasize good loan recovery in their targeting criteria. The bank, in 
tum, is possibly lax in following up on these loans with vigorous recovery efforts, since these 
are not the institution's own funds and the terms and conditions are imposed from the 
outside, thereby contributing to poor loan repayment. 
IV. Recommendations 
The following recommendations should be considered in any new measures 
to deal with the bank's current state of institutional weakness: 
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(1) Eliminate targeting from international donors and the Central Government. 
These actions introduce moral hazard into the bank's operations (i.e., induce 
the bank to accept high-risk clientele and inculcate lax loan administration, 
since all incentives are to push money quickly, at all costs). 
(2) Change the strategic objective of the bank to emphasize financial viability, 
and continue with recent efforts to improve data management, portfolio 
revision, and collateral requirements. 
(3) Encourage the bank to develop more appropriate default and arrears mea-
sures, through a systematic tracking of its medium and long-term loan portfo-
lio, in order to capture installment repayments over the amount actually due, 
as well as documenting deferred payments and the rescheduling of past due 
loans. Periodic reports on loan repayment status should form the basis for 
institutional performance, rather than targeting criteria and the dubious 
practice of measuring the alleged impact of loans on the income of borrowers. 
( 4) Finance continuing investment in computing hardware and training in software 
information technologies, so that the bank can systematically track its portfo-
lio to meet the objectives set forth in (3) above. 
(5) Eliminate all interest rate ceilings on loans and deposits, to allow the bank to 
adjust to an inflationary environment and make appropriate risk-adjusted 
charges to new or high-risk clientele. 
( 6) Encourage decentralization in bank operations, so that branch managers can 
assume more responsibility for loan approvals and rejections. Staff evaluation 
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should then take into account the manager's performance in creating and 
managing a low-default portfolio. 
(7) International donor funds should enter the bank in such a way as to not 
discourage local deposit mobilization efforts. This will create a healthier 
funding base, as more local deposits from the general public grow as a 
proportion of total funding sources. 
(8) Support the bank in efforts to identify feasible bridge loans, where the bank 
can finance processor-marketing intermediaries and credit unions rather than 
farmers directly. Carefully constructed pilot projects could be tried out to 
determine which combination of intermediary-farmer network would prove 
more promising. It is important not to engage in overkill here. The bank 
should have the freedom to test several possible channels and terminate those 
that do not work out successfully. This should be a financial experiment to 
be administered within the capability of the bank's personnel and information 
management system. It should not be a massive program that ove!loads the 
system. 
(9) International donors should protect the bank's institutional viability (and the 
profitability of farming operations financed by the bank) by pressuring the 
Government to remove interest rate ceilings, agricultural price controls, 
overvalued exchange rates, and other measures that compromise the financial 
viability of the bank and the bank's customers. It is important to deregulate 
price controls on agricultural products and the overvalued exchange rate at 
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the same time that interest rates are deregulated, so that the bank's clients 
can more easily pay higher interest charges. 
(10) Encourage the government to undertake reforms towards a more efficient 
prudential regulatory system, that can reduce the risks of moral hazard in the 
financial sector. More effective bank examination procedures are required 
(including BAGRICOLA), as well as honest and responsible reporting of the 
risks inherent in the financial management of the country's formal financial 
intermediaries, along with carefully established rules for risk minimization in 
portfolio management and sanctions for institutions with unacceptable risk 
exposure. 
In the last several years BAGRICOLA has begun to undertake promising internal 
reforms in the face of serious liquidity shortages. The recommendations suggested above 
could greatly facilitate this process and allow the bank to approach the goal of becoming 
a more disciplined, self sustaining institution, serving a responsible rural clientele of deposi-
tors and borrowers. 
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THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 
A LOAN REPAYMENT ANALYSIS1 
Nelson Aguilera, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, and Douglas H. Graham2 
INTRODUCI'ION 
The Agricultural Development Bank of the Dominican Republic (BAGRICOIA) as 
an agricultural development institution, is not only oriented to provide credit to the agricul-
tural sector, but also to serve as a fundamental instrument of the Government's agrarian 
policies. It is by far the most important formal financial intermediary in the rural areas and 
the only source of formal credit for agrarian reform beneficiaries. During the 1983-1987 
period, however, BAGRICOIA's share of the agricultural loan market experienced a sharp 
and sustained decline. As shown in Table 1, the bank's market share declined from 66.3 
percent in 1983 to 37.2 percent in 1987. Commercial banks, on the other hand, increased 
1 This report was prepared for the Agricultural Development Bank of the Dominican 
Republic (Banco Agricola), within the framework of the Rural Financial Services 
Project in the Dominican Republic, sponsored by the Central Bank of the Dominican 
Republic, the United States Agency for International Development, and The Ohio 
State University, through the Cooperative Agreement on Experimental Approaches 
to Rural Savings (Science and Technology Bureau of AID Washington). The views 
are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the sponsoring institutions. The 
authors are grateful to Jeffrey Poyo and Adalgisa Adams, of the Rural Financial 
Services Project in Santo Domingo, and with Pedro Breton, Guillermo Santana, 
Marcos Tolentino, Jose Manuel Estepan, and all the other Banco Agricola officials 
and field staff, whose enthusiastic support made this ambitious undertaking possible. 
2 Aguilera is a Doctoral candidate and Gonzalez-Vega and Graham are Professors in 
the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology at The Ohio State 
University. , 
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their share from 24.7 percent in 1983 to 45.3 percent in 1987. The development banks, in 
turn, increased their share from 9.0 percent in 1983 to 13.6 percent in 1987. 
Table 1: Agricultural Loan Portfolio in the Dominican Republic, 
by Type of Institution, 1983-1987. (Million DR $) 
Type of Financial Institution 
Agricultural 
Bank Commercial Development 
(BAGRICOlA) Banks Banks Total 
Year Value % Value % Value % Value % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1983 255.5 66.3 95.2 24.7 34.7 9.0 385.4 100 
1984 243.2 61.6 115.9 29.4 25.5 8.9 394.6 100 
1985 274.3 56.8 146.2 30.2 62.1 12.9 482.6 100 
1986 280.5 47.7 2114.4 36.5 92.7 15.8 587.6 100 
1987 388.5 37.2 473.6 5.3 142.4 13.6 1004.5 100 
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos, Republica Dominicana, Anuario Estadfstico. 
1987. 
As shown in Table 2, these changing agricultural loan market shares were accompa-
nied by an unstable trend in the total agricultural loan portfolio, measured in 1970 DR$3• 
In effect, the banking system's agricultural loan portfolio declined from DR$ 144.9 million 
in 1983 to DR$ 108.6 million in 1986, representing a fall of more than 25 percent. In 1987, 
this portfolio showed a marked increase, reaching the record level for the period, DR$ 161.8 
million. This growth was mainly due to the sharp increase of the commercial banks' 
3 All amounts in real terms are expressed in pesos at constant 1970 prices. 
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participation in the agricultural loan portfolio, which increased more than 80 percent, from 
DR$ 39.7 million in 1986 to DR$ 72.3 million in 1987. 
Table 2: Real Agricultural Loan Portfolio in the Dominican Republic, by Type· of 
Institution 1983-1987. (Million of constant 1970 DR $) 
Type of Financial Institution 
Agricultural 
Bank Commercial Development 
(BAGRICOLA) Banks Banks Total 
Year Value % Value % Value % Value % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)" (7) (8) 
1983 96.1 66.3 35.8 24.7 13.0 9.0 144.9 100 
1984 76.5 61.6 36.4 29.4 11.2 8.9 124.1 100 
1985 62.1 56.8 33.1 30.2 14.1 12.9 109.2 100 
1986 51.8 47.7 39.6 36.5 17.1 15.8 108.6 100 
1987 62.7 37.2 72.3 45.3 22.9 13.6 161.8 100 
Source: Computed from Table 1, using the implicit GDP deflator. 
These changing loan market shares were accompanied by an unstable trend in the 
BAGRICOLA's loan activities. As shown in Table 3, selected indicators of the bank's loan 
activities experienced during the period a similar behavior. In effect, the real value of 
approved loans, the number of approved loans, and the number of .tareas4 financed show 
a declining trend from 1984 until 1986, when all the indicators reached the lowest level for 
the period. A year later, the number of loans and of tareas funded reached their highest 
4 One tarea is equivalent to 628 square meters. 
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level for the period, and the real value of approved loans increased substantially, as 
compared to 1986, but without reaching the 1984level. During 1987, the sharp increase in 
the number of approved loans and tareas financed determined a drastic fall in the real 
amount per approved loan and tarea financed. 
Table 3: Selected Indicators of BAGRICOLA's Loan Activity, 1983-1987. 
Approved Loans Number of DR$ per 
Year 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Value· 
(1970 DR$) 
(1) 
60,135,900 
61,791,100 
54,415,400 
37,614,000 
58,956,000 
Number 
(000) 
(2) 
31,050 
34,455 
28,787 
18,094 
53,513 
Tare as 
Financed 
(000) 
(3) 
2,089.4 
2,521.8 
1,939.8 
1,571.6 
2,880.7 
Loan 
(1/2) 
(4) 
1,936.7 
1,964.4 
1,890.3 
2,078.8 
1,101.7 
Tarea .. 
(1/3) 
(5) 
28.8 
24.5 
28.1 
23.9 
20.5 
Source: Banco Agricola de la Republica dominicana, Boletin Estadistico, 1987. 
• Deflator: Implicit GDP Deflator. 
•• One tarea equals 628 square meters. 
This evolution reflected the sustained decline of BAGRICOLA's participation in the 
banking system's agricultural loan portfolio, and the increasing liquidity problems experi-
enced by the institution in recent years. This declining share of BAGRICOLA appears to 
be directly related to: 
(a) an increase in agricultural loan activities by commercial and development banks, 
and 
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(b) a deterioration of BAGRICOLA's loan portfolio, due to inflation and loan 
repayment problems. 
The increasing rate of inflation experienced by the country in recent years has played 
an important role in explaining the steady deterioration of BAGRICOLA's loan portfolio. 
The bank, following the Government's agrarian policies, granted loans to rural producers 
at concessional interest rates, usually below the inflation rate. The bank thus failed to 
protect the real value of its loan portfolio. 
Default and arrears in the BAG RICO LA loan portfolio have also played a key role 
in explaining this declining share. The lack of appropriate loan repayment performance 
measures5 has made it difficult, however, to clearly identify the magnitude and the factors 
affecting the repayment problems faced by the bank. As shown in Table 4, the loan repay-
ment performance of the bank appears to have improved during this period. The proportion 
of past due loans fell from 21.1 percent of the portfolio in 1983 to 6.9 percent in 1988. As 
a result, it has been suggested that loan repayment problems are not a main reason for the 
declining participation of BAGRICOLA in the system's agricultural loan portfolio. Increas-
ing inflation and the slow down of international flows of funds have been pointed out as the 
most important factors affecting the increasing liquidity problems experienced by 
BAGRICOLA in recent years. 
The delinquency indicator utilized by the bank is not adequate, however, for any 
meaningful analysis of loan repayment performance at BAGRICOLA. The current policy 
5 The loan delinquency indicator is measured by considering the total unpaid amount 
of past due loans over the total value of the loan portfolio. 
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on loan repayment at BAGRICOLA conforms more to the objective of intermittently 
promoting collection campaigns, to create additional liquidity to service new loan demand, 
rather than rigorously documenting and analyzing the main dimensions of the loan repay-
ment problems in their own right. In order to analyze the importance of these problems, a 
more accurate measurement of loan repayment performance must be adopted. This 
performance must be monitored by following through time the evolution of the repayment 
status of loans disbursed during a specified period of time. 
Table 4: Official Loan Default Index Reported by BAGRICOLA, 1983-1988. 
Loan Amount Default Index 
(DR Pesos) (Percentage) 
Year Past Due Portfolio (1/2) 
(1) (2) (3) 
1983 53,716,257 255,542,211 21.1 
1984 48,296,325 243,190,640 19.9 
1985 45,102,256 272,522,732 16.6 
1986 53,558,211 280,461,565 19.1 
1987 51,160,831 388,462,646 13.0 
1988 43,848,321 633,929,335 6.9 
Source: Banco Agricola de la Republica Dominicana, Boletin Estadistico, 1987. 
Objective 
This report attempts to critically evaluate the loan repayment performance of 
BAGRICOLA, in order to identify the main factors that influence the delinquency problems 
faced by the bank in recent years. More specifically, the main objective is to provide a 
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comprehensive overview of the loan repayment problems faced by the bank, in order to 
guide the bank, the Government, and international donors in formulating relevant policy 
strategies to allow BAGRICOIA to become more financially viable and self-sustaining. 
Methodology 
For the purposes of analyzing the performance of loans disbursed by the bank during 
1987, the repayment status of these loand as of August 31, 1989 was classified into six 
categories: 
1. complete or partial default, if the total loan was in default or some installments of 
long terms loans were unpaid 30 days after the due date; 
2. in litigation, if unpaid loans or installments were subject to legal collection proce-
dures; 
3. rescheduled, if the repayment period of the loan had been extended, without altering 
the amount of the principal and interest outstanding; 
4. paid with a"ears, for loans with completed loan maturity, if the loan or the install-
ments had been paid later than 30 days after the due date; 
5. cu"ent, if loans or installments were not yet due; and 
6. paid without arrears, if loans or installments of long-term loans had been paid within 
30 days of the due date. 
Defaulting loans have beeen just one dimension of the loan repayment problems 
faced by the institution in recent years. Installment arrears and the rescheduling of outstand-
ing loans constitute other important dimensions of the repayment problems faced by the 
banlc Hence, any meaningful analysis of the repayment performance of outstanding loans 
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disbursed by development institutions must examine the importance of rescheduling and 
installment arrears, as well. 
The effects of different borrower and loan characteristics on loan repayment perfor-
mance will be studied by analyzing several cross-classified variables and loan repa~ent. 
Detailed information will be provided in terms of the number and the volume of loans 
granted by type of borrowers, land tenure, type of investment, source of the funds, and type 
of collateral. 
The Data 
To achieve a research design that allows for a comprehensive analysis of the loan 
repayment problems faced by the Agricultural Development Bank of the Dominican 
Republic, special emphasis was placed on collecting and constructing the basic primary data 
set directly from customer dossiers. The data used for this study consist of a sample of 
3,455 loan applications in 1987, from 18 BAGRICOLA branches.6 These branches appro-
priately represent the regional variety that characterizes the barik's loan activities. The 
branches excluded from the sample present characteristics similar to those of the branches 
selected. 
The year 1987 was chosen for two reasons. First, 1987 was a year of "normal" loan 
activity, compared to 1986 and 1988. In 1986, BAGRICOLA's loan activity was the lowest 
recorded during the decade. In 1988, the bank received an important transfer from the 
Government, which contributed to a sharp increase in the volume of loans disbursed. 
6 Bani, Ocoa, Barahona, Comendador, Puerto Plata, Santiago, Valverde, Santiago 
Rodriguez, La Vega, Constanza, San Francisco de Macoris, Salcedo, Rio San Juan, 
Arenosa, Samana, Hato Mayor, Santo Domingo, and Monte Plata. 
9 
Consequently, 1987 reflected more regular market conditions. Second, by studying the bank's 
1987 loan activity we will be able to follow the borrowers' behavior for almost two years 
(through August 1989). This is desirable, in order to more appropriately measure the loan 
repayment problem through time. 
The selected sample of 3,455 loan applications in 1987 represented 8.8 percent of the 
total loan applications received by the selected branches of the bank during that year. 
During 1987, among the 43,251loan applications processed at the selected branches, 36,395 
were approved, 2,928 were rejected, and 3,928 were withdrawn by the customers. 
To maintain a rough balance among accepted, withdrawn, and rejected applications, 
we took 569 rejected, 538 withdrawn, and 2,251 approved loan applications in 1987. Each 
sub-sample was obtained by using systematic sampling. This method consists of selecting a 
sample from a regular interval in the respective loan files, after the first unit has been 
selected with the aid of a table of random numbers. 
The Questionnaires 
After selecting the sample, two questionnaires were designed to collect the relevant 
information. The first consisted of 50 questions where answers were drawn from each 
selected credit dossier. The questions contained in this questionnaire can be grouped in 
three main categories. The first category documents the borrower's characteristics before 
the bank decided to approve or reject the loan application. These data reflect the informa-
tion available for the screening process. The second group of questions documents the 
bank's behavior after the loan was approved but before it was disbursed. The final set of 
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questions documents both the borrower's and the lender's behavior after the loan had been 
disbursed. In particular, we were interested in establishing the lender's collection activities. 
A second questionnaire, containing 21 questions, was designed to identify the 
operational procedures and practices of each selected branch. In this questionnaire we were 
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interested in determining the total expenditure incurred in screening and collection activities 
for each branch. This information complements the data generated from the credit dossiers. 
Organization of the Re_port 
In addition to this introduction, the report contains two sections. The first documents 
in detail the main characteristics of the sample of loans granted by BAGRICOIA during 
1987. The second presents a descriptive profile and interpretive analysis of the repayment 
performance of loans disbursed, by the bank in 1987. The main conclusions and policy 
recomendations are contained in the executive summary preceding this report. 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE OF LOANS GRANTED IN 1987 
The sample gathered information on loans disbursed during 1987 by selected 
BAGRICOIA branches. Detailed information was obtained about the number and volume 
of loans disbursed by type of borrower, land tenure, investment, source of the funds, 
collateral, and loan size. 
Distribution by T~e of Borrower 
Borrower type consists of four main categories: 
(a) First, non-reform individuals comprise all those individual borrowers who are not 
agrarian reform beneficiaries. 
(b) Second, non-agrarian reform associations refer to groups of borrowers not associated 
with the agrarian reform process, but organized to obtain loans from the bank. Each 
member of the association is independently evaluated by the bank before the 
decision is made to disburse the loan. If any member of the association fails to repay 
his loan, the association as a whole is considered liable as a defaulting debtor. 
(c) Third, agrarian reform individuals include all those borrowers who are beneficiaries 
of the agrarian reform process with provisional titles to their lands. 
(d) Fourth, agrarian reform associations correspond to organized groups of agrarian 
reform beneficiaries. 
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Table 5 
Number, Amount, and Average Loan Size by Type of Borrower for the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987. 
Number of Loans Volume Disbursed 
Type of Borrower N % (000) Pesos % 
1. Non-Refo:nn Individual 1702 75.7 5477.2 57.3 
2. Non-Reform Association 17 0.8 272.2 2.8 
3. Agrarian Reform Individual 473 21.0 1373.7 14.4 
4. Agrarian Reform Association 46 2.0 2383.3 24.9 
5. Other 10 0.4 60.7 0.6 
Total 2248 100.0 9567.1 100.0 
Average 
Loan Size 
(000) Pesos 
3.2i 
16.01 
2.90 
51.81 
6.07 
4.26 
The total number and volume of disbursed loans and the average loan size are 
reported in Table 5. A majority of the loans were granted to non-agrarian reform borrowers 
(approximately 77 percent of the total number) and accounted for 61 percent of the total 
volume. On the other hand, 23 percent of the number of loans disbursed to agrarian reform 
beneficiaries accounted for 39 percent of the total amount. 
Average loan size for agrarian reform associations was significantly larger than for 
non-agrarian reform associations. Agrarian reform associations received an average loan size 
more than three times larger than loans for non-agrarian-reform associations. In contrast, 
the average loan for the non-agrarian reform individual borrowers was slightly larger than 
for agrarian reform beneficiaries. 
Distribution by Type of Land Tenure 
Land tenure status was classified into five main categories: 
(a) First are private landowners with well established property rights. 
(b) Second are non-agrarian reform occupants of public lands without property rights. 
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(c) Third are tenants, usually rural producers renting or sharcropping on someone else's 
land. 
(d) Fourth are borrowers whose land has been provided by third parties (usually from 
an extended family member) free of charge. 
(e) Fifth are agrarian reform owners, with provisional titles. 
Table 6: Number, Amount, and Average Loan Size by Type of Land Tenure for the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987. 
Number of Loans Volume Disbursed Average Loan 
Size 
Type of Land Tenure N % (000) Pesos % (000) Pesos 
1. Private Owner 637 '])3.7 2571.6 27.0 4.04 
2. Occupant of Public Lands 872 39.2 2220.2 23.3 255 
3. Tenant 30 1.3 264.0 2.8 8.80 
4. Free-of-charge Land 191 8.6 821.4 8.6 4.30 
5. Agrarian Reform Owner 472 21.2 3481.8 36.5 7.38 
6. Other 21 0.9 176.6 1.9 8.41 
Total 2223 100.0 9535.6 100.0 4.29 
As shown in Table 6, agrarian reform beneficiaries with provisional titles accounted 
for 36.5 percent of the total volume of loans granted during 1987. Landowners and borrow-
ers occupying public lands without title accounted for 27 and 23 percent of the total volume, 
respectively. An important contrast stands out in Table 6 between the average loan size for 
agrarian reform beneficiaries and loan size for private landowners and occupants of public 
lands. Agrarian reform beneficiaries received loans of average size three times larger than 
those for public land occupants, and almost twice as large as those for land owners. This 
result is influenced by the relatively large volume of loans granted to large ~grarian reform 
groups. 
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Distribution by Type of Investment 
· The agricultural activities financed by BAGRICOIA can be classified into five main 
categories. 
(a) First, non-industrial food crops such as rice, cassava, plantain, potatoes, and yegeta-
bles. 
(b) Second, industrial food crops include tomatoes, pineapple, melon, and sorghum. 
(c) Third, agricultural exports comprise activities related to coffee and cacao cultivation. 
(d) Fourth, livestock refers to the production of beef, milk, pork, and poultry. 
(e) The last category consists of the purchase of machinery and equipment. 
A close look at the number and volume of loans disbursed by BAGRICOIA by type 
of investment {Table 7) indicates that even though the bank financed a variety of agricultur-
al activities, its loans tended to be fairly concentrated in non-industrial food crops (mainly 
rice) and livestock activities. Loans for these two purposes accounted for about 90 percent 
of the total number and 80 percent of the volume of loans. This high concentration reflects 
the importance in the cost of living of products such as rice, plantain, beef, milk, and pork. 
The implied lack of diversification suggests, however, that the bank is exposed to the perfor-
mances of few sectors. 
It is also interesting to observe the small average size of loans disbursed for most 
agricultural activities, specially for livestock and non-industrial food crops. This reflects the 
Government's interest in guaranteeing the access of small farmers to credit. 
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Table 7: Number, Amount, and Average Loan Size by Type of Investment for the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987. 
Average Loan 
Number of Loans Volume Disbursed Size 
Type of Investment N % (000) Pesos % (000) Pesos 
1. Non-Industrial Food Crop 821 36.5 4686.6 49.0 5.71 
2. Industrial Food Crop 108 4.8 1050.0 11.0 9.72 
3. Agricultural Export 112 5.0 668.7 7.0 5.97 
4. Livestock 1156 51.4 2774.2 29.0 2.40 
5. Machinery & Equipment 47 2.1 346.9 3.6 7.38 
6. Other 7 0.3 43.3 0.5 6.19 
Total 2251 100.0 9569.7 100.0 4.25 
Distribution by Source of the Funds 
. 
The Agricultural Development Bank's funds come from a variety of sources which, 
for the purposes of this study, have been classified into seven categories: 
(a) First are the bank's own resources (Plan 1 and Plan 5). 
(b) Second are FIDE funds (Fondo de Inversion de Desarrollo Economico). This is a 
special fund (Plan 19) provided by the Central Bank for agricultural development. 
(c) Third are international sources, which comprise a variety of credit lines from foreign 
agencies. One is Plan 37, a special credit line funded by the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (RD$ 36.5 million) and the Dominican Government (RD$ 11.0 million). 
Another is Plan 38, a credit line funded with resources provided by the World Bank 
(US$ 36.6 million), the Dominican Government (US$ 6.59 million), and the final 
beneficiaries (US$ 2.99 million). This credit line was designed to finance coffee and 
cacao development projects. Plan 43 is a rotating fund provided by USAID (DR$ 
67.0 million) and administered by the Central Bank. This fund was provided to 
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finance investment projects selected by the bank and is not subject to any loan 
targeting criteria. 
(d) Fourth is a small livestock line of credit, primarily for the financing of pigs, known 
as the swine fund (Plan 44 ). This credit line was funded by the Government to 
finance the purchase by small swine producers of one pregnant sow, and in some 
cases one pregnant cow. The objective was to increase the swine and cattle popula-
tion in the hands of poor farm-households and thereby improve their income. 
(e) The fifth category is the agrarian reform fund (Plan 44 ). This is a credit line created 
with Government resources to finance the agricultural and livestock activities of 
agrarian reform beneficiaries. 
(f) Sixth are savings accounts funds. This source (Plan 50) uses the funds obtained from 
the bank's deposit mobilization activities. 
(g) The final category, FIDA (Plan 42) corresponds to a special international credit line 
funded with resources provided by the Fonda Intemacional para el Desarrollo 
Agropecuario, to finance the agricultural and livestock activities of small rural 
producers. 
Table 8 clearly indicates that a majority of the loans granted during 1987 were 
disbursed from the bank's own resources (46 percent). Government-sponsored funds 
(agrarian reform and swine plans) accounted for 32 percent of the total volume disbursed. 
It is interesting to observe that Government funds accounted for about 50 percent of the 
total number of loans granted. This obviously reflected the interest of the Government in 
providing credit to small rural producers. This is especially apparent in the case of the small 
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livestock swine fund. International donors provided funds for 15 percent of the total volume 
granted. This clearly reflected the declining participation of international agencies in 
BAGRICOLA's sources of funds. FIDE, FIDA, and savings accounts funds altogether 
financed less than 4 percent of the total amount disbursed. 
Table 8: Number, Amount, and Average Loan Size for the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987 by Source of Funds. 
Number of Loans Volume Disbursed 
Source of Funds N % (000) Pesos % 
1. Own Resources 768 34.1 4395.6 45.9 
2. FIDE 18 0.8 95.7 1.0 
3. International 186 8.3 1404.4 14.7 
4. Swine Fund 896 39.8 1080.9 11.3 
5. Agrarian Reform Fund 196 8.7 1857.9 19.4 
6. Savings Accounts 24 1.1 104.2 1.1 
7. FIDA 131 5.8 182.9 1.9 
8. Other 33 15 448.8 4.7 
Total 2252 100.0 9570.4 100.0 
Average Loan 
Size 
(000) Pesos 
5.72 
5.32 
155 
1.21 
9.48 
4.34 
1.40 
13.60 
4.25 
An important contrast stands out in Table 8 between the average size f~r agrarian 
reform loans and those granted with resources from the Swine Plan. Loans granted with 
resources from the agrarian reform fund had an average size about eight times as large as 
loans provided with resources from the Swine Plan. This striking difference reflects the 
importance of loans to finance large agrarian reform groups, which in turn retail these 
resources to individuals within the group. It also reflects the nature of the resources 
provided for livestock development by the Dominican Government. This fund has been a 
classic case of a social program designed more to satisfy political objectives than to accom-
plish production goals. The large number of loans and the small average loan size of the 
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Swine Plan have heavely impacted on the BAGRICOLA's operation costs, thereby affecting 
its financial viability. 
Distribution by Type of Collateral · 
Collateral was classified in three main categories: 
(a) mortgage; 
(b) crop lien pledges (prenda), loans guaranteed with the output of the investment 
project, and; 
(c) crops in bank custody, loans guaranteed with agricultural produce actually stored 
under bank control (pignoraticia). 
Table 9: Number, Amount, and Average Loan Size by Type of Collateral for the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987. 
Average Loan 
Number of Loans Volume Disbursed Size 
Type of Collateral N % (000) Pesos % (000) Pesos 
1. Mortgage 31 1.4 6545 6.8 21.11 
2. Crop Lien Pleges 2210 98.2 8735.4 91.3 3.95 
3. Crops in Bank Custody 10 0.4 179.0 1.9 17.90 
Total 2251 100.0 9568.9 100.0 4.25 
Table 9 shows the low quality of the collateral provided by the borrowing clientele. 
In effect, more than 98 percent of the loans were disbursed with just prenda as collateral. 
Only one percent of the loans were granted with mortgage as collateral. This is a striking 
result, if we consider the fact that more than 50 percent of the loans were granted either to 
landowners or agrarian reform beneficiaries with provisional titles, who allegedly could be 
in the position of providing a stronger collateral than just a pledge on future agricultural 
production. The absence of efficient legal and judicial procedures for foreclosure, on the 
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other hand, would make mortgages expensive for both borrowers and the bank and still be 
of little value as an incentive for repayment. 
Distribution by Loan Size 
The loans granted in 1987 were classified into three loan size categories, by using the 
percentiles of the distribution of loan size: 
(a) The first category includes the five percent with the largest loans in the overall 
sample. 
(b) The second category includes medium-size loans, comprising 90. percent of the 
sample of loans. 
(c) Finally , the third category, comprising the remaining five percent, consists of the 
smallest loans in the sample. 
Table 10: Number, Amount, and Average Loan Size by Loan Size Category for the 
Sample of Loans Disbursed in 1987. 
Average Loan 
Number of Loans Volume Disbursed Size 
Loan Size N % (000) Pesos % (000) Pesos 
1. Large (more than DRS 14,000) 111 4.9 5111.4 53.4 46.05 
2. Medium (DRS 459- DRS14,000) 2030 90.1 4423.9 46.2 2.18 
3. Small (less than DRS 459) 111 4.9 35.2 0.4 0.32 
Total 2252 100.0 9570.4 100.0 4.25 
The degree of concentration of the loans disbursed during 1987 can be examined in 
Table 10. A large proportion of the amount disbursed (53 percent) corresponded to the five 
percent largest loans, with an average amount of DR$ 46,050. In contrast, the medium 
loan-size category accounted for 46 percent of the total volume granted during 1987, with 
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an average loan size of DR$ 2, 180. The small loan-size category, in tum, accounted for 0.32 
percent of the total volume of loans disbursed, with an average of DR$ 320 per loan. 
Summa:ry 
A majority of the loans disbursed in 1987 were granted to non-agrarian reform 
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beneficiaries. About 60 percent of the total volume corresponded to this category, whereas 
less than 40 percent was granted to agrarian reform beneficiaries. The bank was particularly 
inclined to lend to associations of agrarian reform beneficiaries rather than to individual 
reform beneficiaries. This reflects the bank's attempt to reduce lending costs, by avoiding 
a large number of loans to small rural producers. 
Loans were mainly disbursed for non-industrial food crops such as rice, plantain, 
cassava, and potatoes. Almost half of the total amount of loans disbursed during 1987 were 
granted to finance these activities. The bank's own resources accounted for almost half of 
the total funds available during that year, while government-sponsored funds (swine and 
agrarian reform plans) accounted for about 30 percent of the total amount. Internationally 
sourced funds accounted for less than 15 percent of the total. 
A high proportion of the loans were guaranteed with just the output of the invest-
ment project (i.e., prenda). In effect, 98 percent of the loans were granted with only the 
agricultural output as collateral, and less than 2 percent required mortgages. Finally, over 
half of the total volume disbursed during 1987 was granted to less than five percent of the 
number of borrowers. This is in part related to the bank's attempts to reduce lending costs. 
Obviously, it is cheaper to lend to individuals organized through associations than to lend 
to each member separately. 
REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE OF LOANS GRANTED IN 1987 
The loan repayment performance index used by BAGRICOIA measures the ratio 
between the unpaid amount of past due loans and the total value of outstanding lo~. This 
is clearly not adequate to analyze loan repayment performance. The index understimates 
the true magnitude of the loan repayment problems faced by the institution. On the one 
hand, the numerator of this ratio includes only the unpaid amount of past due loans that 
have completed their term maturity and were in default 30 days after the final term due 
date. Hence, it does not include unpaid installments of medium and long-term loans, 
rescheduled loans, or loans finally paid with arrears. Rescheduling and arrears are also 
repayment problems that must be analyzed, since at least in the short-run they may affect 
the bank's liquidity. On the other hand, the index is not easy to interpret. While the payment 
of an installment reduces both the numerator and denominator by the same magnitude, the 
disbursement of new loans reduces the index by only increasing the denominator. Thus, 
portfolio quality may artificially appear to improve with the rapid disbursing of new 
long-term loans. 
This section presents a detailed analysis of the repayment performance of loans 
granted by the BAGRICOIA during 1987. The repayment performance of these loans as 
of August 31, 1989 is examined on the basis of a classification of outstanding balances into 
six categories: 
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(a) First, default refers to the unpaid amount of loans with completed maturity in 
arrears at least 30 days after the due date for the final payment (total default), as 
well as unpaid installments of longer-term loans already due for 30 days (partial 
default). This category represents hard core default. 
(b) In liti~ation refers to the amount of unpaid loans in the process of judicial collection. 
(c) Third, rescheduled loans refer to those loans for which the repayment period has 
been extended, without altering the sum of the principal and interest outstanding. 
(d) Fourth, paid with arrears comprise all loans of completed maturity that were eventu-
ally repaid, in full or in part, 30 days after the due date. 
(e) The fifth category refers to current loans, for which no payments were yet due. 
(f) The sixth category refers to loans paid without arrears, for which payment for term 
installments or completed term loans had been made before or within 30 days of the 
due date. 
Table 11 shows that 45 percent of the loans granted in 1987, accounting for 20 
percent of the total amount, were in partial or total default as of the end of August, 1989. 
Total or partial default, however, is just one dimension of the loan repayment problem faced 
by the institution. Payment with arrears and the rescheduling of loans constitute another 
important dimension of these problems. As reported in Table 11, about 22 percent of the 
loans disbursed during 1987, accounting for 33 percent of total value, were paid at least 30 
days after their due dates. Furthermore, 5.4 percent of the loans, accounting for 4.2 percent 
of the total amount, had been rescheduled. 
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Considering not only unpaid installments and completely defaulted loans, but also 
rescheduled loans and loans paid with arrears, 72 percent of the number of loans, account-
ing for about 60 percent of the total volume, registered repayment problems. This striking 
result obviously contradicts the bank's official statement concerning the magnitude of the 
loan repayment problems in 1987, in which only 13 percent of the portfolio was considered 
in default (Table 4 ). Thus, it is clear that these loan repayment problems are not a minor 
(or declining) issue for the institution. On the contrary, deficient loan recovery is of primary 
importance in explaining the increased liquidity problems experienced by the institution in 
recent years. 
Repayment Status 
Default 
In Litigation 
Rescheduled 
Paid With Arrears 
Current 
Paid Without Arrears 
Table 11: Distribution of the Repayment Status as of 
August 1989 for the Sample of Loans Disbursed in 1987 
Average Loan Proportion of the 
Size Volume Disbursed 
D.R Pesos % 
3406.7 20.1 
10561.0 0.4 
5274.1 4.1 
6429.4 33.0 
61545 11.6 
2267.2 8.8 
Loan Repayment by Type of Borrower 
Proportion of the 
Number of Loans 
% 
44.9 
0.2 
5.4 
21.9 
10.2 
16.7 
Table 12 shows the repayment status as of August 31, 1989 for the sample of loans 
disbursed in 1987, by type of borrower. Loans disbursed to agrarian reform beneficiaries 
presented a poorer repayment performance than loans disbursed to non-agrarian reform 
borrowers. On the one hand, 57 percent of the number of loans, accounting for 32 percent 
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of the total amount disbursed to individual beneficiaries of the agrarian reform process, 
were in complete or partial default (i.e., hardcore default in the second column of Table 12). 
On the other hand, 42 percent of the loans, accounting for 20 percent of the total amount 
disbursed to individual non-reform borrowers, were in complete or partial default. At the 
same time, 23 percent of the number of loans, accounting for 2.1 percent of the total volume 
disbursed to non-reform associations, were in complete or partial default, while 41.5 percent 
of the loans, accounting for 18 percent of the amount disbursed to associations of agrarian 
reform beneficiaries, were also in default. 
Table 12: Repayment Status as of August 30th 1989 for the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987, by Type of Borrower 
A. Proportion of the Volume Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
Volume In Paid with Paid without 
Disbursed Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current Arrears 
Type of Borrower (000) Pesos % % % % % % 
1. Non-Reform Individual 5597.92 20.2 05 35 31.6 17.8 13.1 
2. Non-Reform Association 330.18 2.1 16.1 58.8 19.9 2.4 
3. Agrarian Reform Individual 1244.35 31.8 0.7 10.0 26.2 45 8.1 
4. Agrarian Reform Association 2325.29 17.9 1.4 37.9 05 1.0 
5. Other 60.75 11.3 82.3 1.8 
B. Proportion of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
In Paid with Paid without 
Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current Arrears 
Type of Borrower Number of % % % % % % 
Loans 
1. Non-Reform Individual 1737 42.0 0.1 4.4 23.9 11.1 185 
2. Non-Reform Association 22 22.7 9.1 36.4 18.2 13.6 
3. Agrarian Reform Individual 432 57.4 05 95 13.9 6.7 12.0 
4. Agrarian Reform Association 41 415 2.4 39.0 9.8 7.3 
5. Other 10 80.0 10.0 10.0 
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Although both types of associations showed a lower default rate than individual 
borrowers, the proportion of the number of loans paid by the due date was still extremely 
low, representing only 3.4 percent of the total amount disbursed (i.e., the final column in 
panel A of Table 12). This was due to a large percentage of the amount disbutsed to 
associations that was paid with arrears. Approximately 59 percent of the amounts disbursed 
to associations of non-reform borrowers, and 38 percent of the amounts disbursed to 
associations of reform beneficiaries were paid with arrears (i.e., column 5, panel A). This 
may be explained in part by the fact that the members of the associations do not harvest 
their output at the same time, and the fact that these loans are not considered as paid until 
the last member of the association has cancelled his obligation. 
Loan Repayment by Type of Land Tenure 
Table 13 shows the profile of repayment as of August 31, 1989 for the sample of 
loans, according to the tenure status of the borrower. Agrarian reform beneficiaries with 
provisional titles recorded the poorest loan repayment performance, in comparison to 
landowners and occupants of public lands without title. In effect, 57 percent of the number 
of loans disbursed to agrarian reform beneficiaries were in default, while 41 and 42 percent 
of the loans disbursed to landowners and occupants of public lands without title were in 
default, respectively. 
Thus, the repayment performance of landowners and of occupants of public lands 
without title was quite similar. This is a counterintuitive result. One would expect that 
occupants of public lands without title would have a poorer repayment performance than 
owners with title. Moreover, the occupants of public lands without title recorded one of the 
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highest proportion of loans paid by the due date. It is also interesting to note that the 
repayment performance of owners, occupants of public lands, and agrarian reform beneficia-
ries, measured in terms of the unpaid amount of past due loans, was also quite similar. 
These results suggest that the nature of land tenure is not an important factor affecting loan 
repayment performance. This may be related to the poor collateral requirements of the 
bank. The bank requires mortgages only for loans above DR$ 70,000. 
Table 13: Repayment Status by August 30th 1989 of the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987, by Type of Land Tenure 
A. Proportion of the Volume Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
Volume In Paid with Paid without 
Disbursed Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current Arrears 
Type of Land Tenure (000) Pesos % % % % % % 
1. Private Owner 2569.57 18.9 1.0 2.9 35.0 22.8 8.3 
2. Occupant of Public Land 2219.21 22.9 6.9 23.3 14.5 16.7 
3. Tenant 263.98 5.4 2.9 79.5 1.8 8.7 
4. Free-of-charge land 819.50 14.1 0.1 1.4 39.1 18.0 14.5 
5. Agrarian Reform Owner 3478.14 23.4 0.2 4.5 32.0 1.9 3.6 
6. Other 176.58 4.2 89.3 5.9 
B. Proportion of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
In Paid with Paid without 
Loans Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current Arrears 
Type of Land Tenure Disbursed % % % % % % 
1. Private Owner 635 41.3 0.2 3.8 28.5 12.1 14.2 
2. Occupant of Public Land 871 42.4 5.2 19.7 11.5 21.2 
3. Tenant 30 33.3 6.7 36.7 6.7 16.7 
4. Free-of-charge land 189 37.6 0.5 3.7 28.6 9.0 20.6 
5. Agrarian Reform Owner 471 56.9 0.4 8.9 15.1 7.0 11.7 
6. Other 21 33.3 42.9 23.8 
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Loan Repayment by Type of Investment 
Table 14 shows the repayment profile by the activities financed. Loans disbursed for 
livestock activities clearly presented the poorest repayment performance. Roughly 57 percent 
of the loans, accounting for 30 percent of the total amount disbursed to finance livestock 
. . 
activities, were in default. On the other hand, the proportion of the amount disbursed to 
finance non-industrial food crops, industrial food crops, agricultural exports, and machinery 
and equipment did not reach 20 percent in any case. However, of the amounts disbursed to 
finance industrial food crops and agricultural exports, 81 and 55 percent were paid with at 
least 30 days of arrears. Non-industrial food-crops also presented a high proportion (28 
percent) of payment with arrears, due mainly to the fact that rice farming accounted for a 
large proportion of the activities included in this category. These results suggest that loans 
disbursed to finance agricultural activity that requires industrial processing contribute, at 
least in the short-run, to the bank's collection problems. The high level of arrears presented 
in these categories is linked to marketing problems faced by the borrowers. The 
agro-industrial processors and rice millers normally pay the farm-borrowers for their 
produce only after a delay in processing and the final sales of the output to wholesalers 
and/ or retailers. 
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Table 14: Repayment Status by August 30th 1989 of the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987, by Type of Investment 
A. Proportion of the Volume Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
Volume In Paid with Paid without 
Disbursed Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current Arrears 
' Type of Investment (000) Pesos % % % % % % 
1. Non-Industrial Food Crop 4682.86 18.6 0.7 7.2 28.0 3.4 11.7 
2. Industrial Food Crop 1049.95 7.1 1.5 81.4 4.0 2.4 
3. Agricultural Export 668.72 16.2 0.9 54.5 19.1 73 
4. Livestock 2769.33 30.0 0.1 1.5 22.5 24.3 8.2 
5. Machinery & Equipment 346.93 18.2 1.4 16.9 36.4 1.5 
6. Other 43.30 35.2 24.7 9.0 17.9 
B. Proportion of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
In Paid with Paid without 
Loans Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current Arrears 
Type of Investment Disbursed % % % % % % 
1. Non-Industrial Food Crop 820 32.8 0.2 10.4 27.9 3.5 25.1 
2. Industrial Food Crop 108 25.9 4.6 38.9 9.3 21.3 
3. Agricultural Export 112 24.1 2.7 28.6 14.3 30.4 
4. Livestock 1151 57.4 0.2 2.3 16.4 13.8 9.9 
5. Machinery & Equipment 47 46.8 2.1 17.0 29.8 4.3 
6. Other 7 42.9 14.3 14.3 28.6 
Loan Repayment by Source of the Funds 
Table 15 shows the repayment status by source of the funds. The best loan recovery 
for loans disbursed in 1987 was for those funded by the bank's deposit mobilization activities 
(savings accounts), while the worst repayment performance was for loans funded by 
resources provided by the Fondo International para el Desarrollo Agropecuario (FIDA), to 
finance the agricultural and livestock activities of small rural producers. Only 4.2 percent 
29 
of the number of loans, accounting for 0.2 percent of the total amount disbursed with funds 
provided by the savings accounts, were in default, while 74 percent of the loans, accounting 
for 54 percent of the total amount disbursed with FIDA funds, were in total or partial 
default. 
Table 15: Repayment Status by August 30th 1989 of the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987, by Source of the Funds 
A. Proportion of the Volume Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
Volume in Paid with Paid without 
Disbursed Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current Arrears 
Source of Funds (000) Pesos % % % % % % 
1. Own Resources 4394.59 11.9 2.3 34.2 14.9 10.3 
2. FIDE 95.74 7.9 27.8 10.9 9.5 5.5 17.1 
3. International 1404.38 32.3 0.4 28.3 22.9 10.9 
4. Swine Fund 10n.95 48.4 0.2 1.9 16.6 6.5 12.2 
5. Agrarian Reform Fund 1854.19 18.6 12.4 37.7 2.3 3.3 
6. Saving Account 104.24 0.1 49.9 1.0 -~ 42.4 
7. FIDA Fund 182.91 53.7 19.2 3.8 1.5 0.4 
8. Other 447.78 4.3 1.7 83.8 6.9 1.0 
B. Proportion of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
In Paid with Paid without 
Loans Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current Arrears 
Source of Funds Disbursed % % % % % % 
1. Own Resources 767 24.4 4.3 35.2 9.6 26.5 
2. FIDE 18 11.1 5.6 16.7 16.7 16.7 33.3 
3. International 186 32.8 2.7 21.0 21.5 22.0 
4. Swine Fund 893 63.9 0.2 2.2 12.5 10.6 10.4 
5. Agrarian Reform Fund 195 41.0 17.4 25.1 5.6 10.8 
6. Savings Account 24 4.2 41.7 4.2 50.0 
7. FIDA Fund 131 74.0 19.1 3.8 2.3 0.8 
8. Other 32 34.4 3.1 40.6 9.4 12.5 
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Loans funded with the bank's own resources presented a better repayment perfor-
mance than loans funded with funds provided by international agencies. Approximately 24 
percent of the number of loans, accounting for 12 percent of the amount disbursed with the 
bank's own resources, were in default. In contrast, 33 percent of the loans, accounting for 
32 percent of the amount disbursed with internactional resources, were in default by August 
30, 1989. 
Usually poor recovery stands out for loans from special Government funds. In effect, 
64 percent of the number of loans, accounting for 48 percent of the amount disbursed with 
funds from the swine fund, were in total or partial default. At the same time, 41 percent of 
the number of loans, accounting for 19 percent of the amount disbursed with agrarian 
reform funds, were in partial or complete default. 
Loans funded through the new savings accounts and the bank's own resources are not 
subject to targeted lending to selected groups or activities. Branch managers have some 
degree of flexibility to choose their clientele. International and government-sponsored funds, 
on the other hand, force bank managers to allocate their funds to targeted groups, regions, 
or agricultural activities regardless of the potential risk involved. As shown in Table 15, the 
repayment performance of targeted loans is notoriously poorer than that for non-targeted 
loans. 
Recently, USAID provided BAGRICOIA with RD$ 67.0 million, to create a special 
credit line to finance the bank's lending activities without any targeted restriction on its loan 
allocation operations. Thus, branch managers have been able to select their clientele freely. 
Obviously, a comparison between the status of loans disbursed with the international 
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non-targeted loans (USAID) and those disbursed with international targeted funds (IDB, 
World Bank, and FIDA) is relevant, in order to understand the effect of loan targeting on 
loan repayment problems. 
Source of Funds 
1. IDB Fund 
2. World Bank Fund 
3. FIDA Fund 
4. Rotating AID Fund 
Source of Funds 
1. IDB Fund 
2. World Bank Fund 
3. FIDA Fund 
4. Rotating AID Fund 
Table 16: Repayment Status by August 30th 1989 of the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987, by International Source of Funds 
A. Proportion of the Volume Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
Volume Paid with 
Disbursed Default Rescheduled Arrears Current 
(000) Pesos % % % % 
798.33 38.7 0.2 22.4 23.9 
283.90 45.0 4.4 45.6 
182.91 53.7 19.2 3.8 15 
322.15 5.3 1.2 63.9 0.6 
B. Proportion of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
Paid with 
Number of Default Rescheduled Arrears Current 
Loan % % % % 
59 33.9 3.4 16.9 20.3 
61 50.8 3.3 44.3 
131 74.0 19.1 3.8 2.3 
66 15.2 45 40.9 15 
Paid without 
Arrears 
% 
10.3 
0.1 
0.4 
21.9 
Paid without 
Arrears 
% 
25.4 
1.6 
0.8 
37.9 
As shown in Table 16, loans disbursed with non-targeted funds provided by USAID 
showed a remarkably good repayment performance. Only 5.3 percent of the total amount 
disbursed with these funds in 1987 were in total or partial default by the end of August, 
1989, while 39, 45, and 54 percent of the amount disbursed in 1987 with funds provided by 
the IDB, the World Bank and FIDA, respectively, were in default. Clearly, these other 
donors' funds have been provided to finance predetermined, default-prone groups of 
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borrowers and agricultural actiVities, preventing branch managers from selecting their 
clientele freely. 
Loan Repayment by Type of Collateral 
Table 17 shows the repayment status by type of collateral. About 22 percent of the 
. 
number, accounting for 18.5 percent of the volume of mortgage loans, were in total or 
partial default by the end of August, 1989. At the same time, 45 percent of the number of 
crop lien (i.e., prenda) loans, accounting for 21 percent of the volume, were in default. 
Moreover, the slightly lower default rate of mortgage loans (by volume) cannot be interpret-
ed as a sign of better loan recovery than for loans collateralized with a pledge on future 
agricultural production, since 35.5 percent of the former were not yet due by the end of 
August, 1989. A better indication of the repayment performance of mortgage loans may be 
obtained by analyzing the proportion of loans paid with and without arrears. In effect, if we 
analyze the repayment performance of mortgage and crop lien loans, we see that both types 
present a similar performance. This indicates that mortgages do not necessarily improve the 
repayment performance of loans for BAGRICOLA. 
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Table 17: Repayment Status by August 30th 1989 of the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987, by Type of Collateral 
A. Proportion of the Volume Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
Volume In Paid with Paid without 
Disbursed Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current A,rrears 
Type of Collateral (000) Pesos % % % % % % 
1. Mortgage 654.48 18.5 28.9 40.1 9.4 
2. Crop Lien Pledges 8726.82 20.9 0.1 4.6 33.9 9.5 9.2 
3. Crops in Bank Custody 178.99 8.2 14.9 41.3 22.3 
Proportion of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
In Paid with Paid without 
Loans Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current Arrears 
Type of Collateral Disbursed % % % % % % 
1. Mortgage 31 22.6 25.8 35.5 16.1 
2. Crop Lien Pledges 2204 45.4 0.1 5.4 22.1 9.8 17.1 
3. Crops in Bank Custody 10 20.0 10.0 60.0 10.0 
Repayment Performance and Credit Evaluation 
Targeted lending to select groups or activities is the most important factor explaining 
repayment performance at BAGRICOLA. During 1987, loans disbursed with Government 
and international funds forced branch managers to allocate their funds to targeted groups, 
regions, and agricultural activities. Targeting funds prevents two important functions of the 
lender: 
(a) determining creditworthiness and risk among potential borrowers, and 
(b) providing incentives for borrowers to repay their loans (collection activities and 
penalties on loan default). Poor credit evaluation and weak loan recovery efforts 
affect portfolio risk. 
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Targeted loans disbursed with Government and international funds show a remark-
ably poor repayment performance compared to non-targeted ·funds (own resources, savings 
accounts, rotating USAID fund). This result reflects the effect of targeting criteria on the 
branch manager's credit evaluation role. The credit evaluation operations carried out by 
branch managers to select their customers appear to be quite succesful. As shown in Table 
18, the lowest default rates were recorded for loans disbursed to customers rated as 
excellent, while the highest default rates were recorded for new customers and customers 
with previous default problems. 
Table 18: Repayment Status By August 30th 1989 of the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987, by Customer Credit Rating 
A Proportion of the Volume Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
Volume In Paid with Paid without 
Disbursed Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current Arrears 
Customer Credit Rating (000) Pesos % % % % % % 
1. Excellent 129750 7.9 25 55.1 14.9 11.2 
2. Very Good 1069.47 5.2 3.2 51.3 27.1 15 
3. Good 1479.05 8.4 1.8 4.7 51.3 10.8 13,3 
4. Fair 1631.98 17.2 05 2.3 17.0 3.0 4.3 
5. New 3088.36 29.8 0.1 3.1 26.7 13.1 9.3 
6. Defaulting 26652 42.9 7.2 8.1 5.1 17.1 
8. No Specified 234.02 11.9 38.8 12.4 5.2 0.2 
B. Proportion of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
In Paid with Paid without 
Loans Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current Arrears 
Customer Credit Rating Disbursed % % % % % % 
1. Excellent 190 13.7 5.3 44.2 8.9 27.9 
2. Very Good 140 16.4 6.4 29.3 17.1 30.7 
3. Good 301 18.6 0.3 6.6 30.9 11.0 32.6 
4. Fair 144 315 0.7 35 31.9 0.7 16.7 
5.New 1209 51.1 0.2 4.7 17.0 9.8 105 
6. Defaulting 84 52.4 7.1 4.8 95 26.2 
8. No Specified 48 50.0 8.3 22.9 16.7 2.1 
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It is interesting to observe, however, that the default rates of customers classified as 
excellent, very good, and good are still high. This suggests that factors other than restrictions 
on credit evaluation contribute to the repayment problems experienced by the bank. 
If we look closely at the profile of client ratings by source of funds we find th(l.t there 
is an apparent inconsistent criterion for evaluating loan applicants. The credit evaluation 
criterion for international fund applicants appears to be more relaxed than that for the 
bank's own-resources applicants. As shown in Table 19, more than 56 percent of interna-
tionally funded loans were granted to clients rated either excellent, very good, or good, while 
45 percent of the bank's own resources were granted to these same categories. This is 
inconsistent, if we consider that more than 30 percent of the internationally funded loans 
were in actual default as of August, 1989, while 24 percent of loans made with own-resourc-
es were in partial or complete default at the time. This result suggests that branch managers 
may use a more relaxed credit evaluation criterion for selecting customers for internationally 
funded loans than when drawing on its own resources. It is international money and not bank 
money that is at risk. Hence, the criterion for evaluating the loan applicants for these special 
funds does not appear to be very strict. This is a moral hazard problem at the lender level. 
If the lender adopts a more relaxed credit evaluation criterion (i.e., classifying clients 
as excellent, very good, and good credit risks when in fact they don't rate this classification), 
then it is reasonable to think that the bank's customers are able to recognize the soft 
character of these funds, as well, thereby stimulating poorer repayment performance. There 
exists, therefore, a possibility of a double moral hazard problem with loans disbursed with 
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international funds. It is also apparent that Government funds present the same double 
moral hazard problem. 
Table 19: Profile of Borrower Credit Rating Characteristics of the Sample of 
Loans Disbursed in 1987, by Source of the Funds (Percentages) 
Customer Credit Rating 
Excellent Very Good Good Fair New Defaulting No-Rating 
Number of Loans 190 141 302 144 1212 84 49 
Source of the Funds: 
Own Resources 12.47 9.32 24.93 9.18 41.23 3.70 2.60 
FIDE Fund 20.00 6.67 20.00 13.33 13.33 26.67 
International 27.33 13.66 18.01 9.94 27.33 4.97 2.48 
Swine Fund 2.69 3.27 5.61 3.27 81.52 3.74 2.22 
Agrarian Reform Fund 9.74 9.74 17.95 13.33 41.05 7.18 3.59 
Saving Accounts 70.83 16.67 ·12.50 4.17 4.17 
FIDAFund 0.92 2.75 7.34 6.42 82.57 1.83 
Other 15.15 12.12 27.27 12.12 45.45 
The high default rates recorded for loans disbursed from the swine plan and FIDA 
fund suggest that the bank could not apply rigorous credit evaluation procedures because 
most of these customers were :new. About 80 percent of the total number of loans disbursed 
with these funds were granted to new customers. This result reflects the highly restrictive 
(i.e., targeted) nature of these funds. 
Finally, it is important to highlight the strict customer rating for loans granted with 
resources obtained from the savings accounts. More than 80 percent of the customers funded 
with this credit line were rated as excellent or very good. Obviously, this strict credit 
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evaluation process is reflected in the excellent repayment performance recorded for this 
clientele. 
Summary 
Overall, loans disbursed to agrarian reform borrowers presented a poorer repayment 
performance than loans granted to non-reform clients. The bank, in an attempt to decrease 
the risks and high lending costs associated with individual reform borrowers, tended to favor 
larger group loans in the agrarian reform portfolio. While the bank did succeed in decreas-
ing the volume of completely defaulted loans, nevertheless the volume of partial arrears 
increased substantially. 
One interesting finding is the poorer repayment performance of loans disbursed to 
borrowers with title to their land compared to occupants of public lands without title. This 
is a counterintuitive result. Obviously, one would expect the latter to have a poorer repay-
ment performance than the former. This finding may be related to the low level of mortgage 
collateralization at the bank. More than 98 percent of all loans were granted with only a 
crop lien as collateral. Mortgage collateral was required for less than 2 percent of the total 
number of loans disbursed in 1987. 
Loans disbursed to finance livestock activities presented the worst repayment perfor-
mance. Activities related to modern marketing channels, such as agricultural exports and 
industrial food crops, presented extremely high arrear problems. More than 80 and 50 
percent of the loan volume disbursed to industrial food crops and agricultural exports were 
paid with arrears. This repayment problem is associated with marketing problems experi-
enced by farm-borrowers that invest in these activities. In fact, agro-industry processors and 

